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A DIVIDED SOCIETY: CHINESE PUBLIC OPINION ON 
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW   
 
Han Zhu* 	
Background 
In 2014, the Occupy Central (OC) Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower 
Movement in Taiwan were heated topics worldwide, and within China this was no 
exception. Between the two high-profile movements, the former has attracted more 
attention in Chinese media and society since it was directly related to the “one 
country, two systems” policy. In fact, the OC Movement is the first widely reported 
and discussed democratic movement that has occurred within PRC territory since the 
1989 Tiananmen Square movement. It thus provides a rare opportunity to observe 
Chinese public opinion, especially as regards democracy and civil disobedience in the 
post-1989 era. Although there have been empirical studies on the participants in the 
OC Movement,1 as well as on the influence of the China factor on the Sunflower 
Movement,2 no systematic research has been conducted with regard to public opinion 
towards the two movements and the relevant issues involved in each. As more and 
more activists, scholars, and politicians realize that the development of democracy in 
Mainland China is vital for that in Hong Kong—and perhaps even in Taiwan—the 
consciousness of democracy and the rule of law for Mainland Chinese is certainly one 
of the key factors worth observing in the discussion on the development of democracy 
and political movements throughout the three regions. 
    However, there are some important questions that we must first consider: what 
impact have the OC and Sunflower Movements had on Mainland China? Besides the 
official cliché criticism of these two movements, how do common Chinese citizens 
view the civil disobedience movements in these two regions? Further, how much do 
Chinese citizens know about these two movements? To date only a handful of media 
reports based on sporadic interviews have revealed the attitudes of Mainland Chinese 
towards the OC Movement, which have been mostly negative.3 In contrast, some 
Mainland Chinese activists have expressed support for the OC Movement, and their 
public activism has resulted in serious crackdowns.4 Their courage to openly support 																																																								
* Assistant research officer, Centre for Chinese Law, Faculty of Law of the University of Hong Kong. 
Email: zhuhanhk@hku.hk. The author would like to thank several friends and colleges for assisting 
with data collection and analysis. Without their help, this research would not have been possible. Their 
names are not disclosed for security reasons. The author would also like to extend gratitude to all the 
respondents who took the time and “risks” to participate in the survey.  
1 E.g., Samson Yuen & Edmund Cheng, “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Protests Were More than Just a 
Student Movement”, ChinaFile (1 July 2015), available at https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-
opinion/features/hong-kongs-umbrella-protests-were-more-just-student-movement; also see five public 
opinion polls conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong, available 
at https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/report/mpCEnOCC/index.html. 	
2 E.g., Jieh-min Wu, “Citizen Resistance Movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan under the Influence of 
‘China Factor’”, in Xie Zhenglun (ed.), Dongya diqu de hezuo yu heping (Coordination and Peace in 
East Asia)(Taipei: Qianwei, 2014), pp 130-144. 3	The most influential one might be a NYT report: Andrew Jacob, “In Beijing, Young Chinese See 
Little to Cheer in Hong Kong Protests”, New York Times (11 October 2014), available at 
http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20141011/c11beijing/en-us/; another NYT article mentioned the ignorance 
of most Chinese citizens of the OC Movement in Hong Kong: Edward Wong & Didi Kirsten Tatlow, 
“Beijing Blocks Reports on Hong Kong Democracy Movement”, New York Times (30 September 
2014), available at	http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20140930/c30block/en-us/. 	4 See “Chinese Authorities Make Arrests in Attempt to Prevent Pro-Democracy Campaigns on 
Mainland”, New York Times (10 October 2014), available at http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20141010/ 
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the OC Movement is in sharp contrast with the mainstream views held throughout 
Chinese society. 
    This chapter aims to examine public opinion on the two civil disobedience 
movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan, with a focus on the former. Questionnaire 
surveys were conducted with Mainland Chinese citizens to evaluate the consciousness 
of democracy and the rule of law, and also to explore the gap between ordinary 
citizens and the weiquan (rights defence) sector.5 The article attempts to provide 
answers to some bewildering developments of democracy and liberalism under 
China’s authoritarianism, such as the passivity of a wider civil society towards 
democracy and the emergence of young elites who have been educated overseas, but 
who remain critical of the “western-style” democracy and liberalism. It also provides 
some perspective for the weiquan sector in Mainland China and the civil societies in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, regarding the opportunities and obstacles they face in 
mobilizing wider public support for rights campaigns and democratic movements. 
    As some academics have justifiably pointed out, political consciousness is an 
abstract concept that is difficult to directly observe, often requiring multi-dimensional 
measurements.6 The OC Movement provides a valuable opportunity to probe the 
political consciousness of the public in contemporary China. The survey solicited the 
respondents of three types of Mainlanders as a means to differentiate and compare the 
attitudes among ordinary Chinese citizens: individuals who live in Mainland China, 
overseas Mainland Chinese (mostly students residing in Hong Kong), and the 
weiquan activists (who are either located in Mainland China or overseas). The survey 
was designed to answer the following questions:  
    (1) How do Chinese citizens view the OC and Sunflower Movements? What is the 
gap between the consciousness of common citizens and the weiquan sector, and what 
is the difference between citizens in Mainland China and their counterparts overseas 
(particularly in Hong Kong)? 
    (2) In the opinion of Chinese citizens, is there any difference between democracy 
and the rule of law? Does nationalism influence their opinions on the OC Movement, 
democracy and rule of law?  
    (3) Does free access to information and media influence the opinions of Mainland 
Chinese towards social movements, democracy and the rule of law? 
  
Data and Methods 
Quantitative Data Collection Methods 
Quantitative data was collected through a questionnaire survey, which was mainly 
conducted from January to April 2016. Collection began after the incidents 
surrounding the forced disappearance of five booksellers in Hong Kong, which were 
publicly reported both in Hong Kong and throughout Mainland China in January 
2016.7 The survey questionnaire included asking about respondent’s views on this 																																																																																																																																																														
c10detentions/en-us/; “Four mainlanders jailed for supporting Occupy Central”, EJ Insight (8 April 
2016), available at http://www.ejinsight.com/20160408-four-mainlanders-jailed-supporting-occupy-
central/.		
5 The weiquan sector refers to a small but influential group of lawyers, rights NGOs, citizen activists, 
legal experts, and liberal intellectuals who seek to defend civil rights through legal mobilization or 
other activism. For a detailed introduction on the term “weiquan,” see Jonathan Benney, Defending 
rights in Contemporary China (Oxford: Routledge, 2012), pp 12-34. 	
6 Jianhua Zhu et al., “Public Political Consciousness in China: An Empirical Profile” (1990) 10 Asian 
Survey 992, 994. 	
7 E.g., “Missing, Presumed Detained: Hong Kong Publishers of Books Critical of China Go Missing”, 
South China Morning Post (4 January 2016), available at http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-
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incident along with the OC Movement, with the aim of evaluating the possible 
differences between the opinions of Chinese citizens towards democracy and the rule 
of law.  
    As stated above, the respondents were categorized as: (1) ordinary Chinese citizens 
who reside in Mainland China (hereinafter “Mainland Chinese” or “Category 1”), (2) 
Overseas Mainlanders, who were mostly university students residing in Hong Kong 
(hereinafter “Overseas Mainlanders” or “Category 2”), and (3) Mainlanders involved 
with weiquan activism, primarily rights advocacy lawyers and NGO activists 
(hereinafter the “Weiquan sector”). The sample was selected by convenience and 
strongly relied on snowball sampling. Table 1 shows the number of respondents in the 
three categories. Among the 478 completed questionnaires, 441 were web-based8 
while 37 were performed by hand (mainly collected in Hong Kong). 
 
 
    The process of distributing and collecting questionnaires was in itself an interesting 
field study, which to some extent reflected the political atmosphere in China and the 
diversity of Chinese Mainlanders’ attitudes towards the survey’s “sensitive” issues. 
During the direct distribution of 62 questionnaires, only one respondent openly 
rejected the questionnaire due to disinterest and lack of knowledge in political issues, 
and three potential participants did not respond. Many of the respondents joked that 
they were risking their life to complete the questionnaire and might be invited “to 
drink tea” (i.e., getting questioned by the authorities).9 A government official at the 
county level claimed to have little knowledge about the incidents, consulted party-
state opinions on the issues, and filled in the questionnaire accordingly. An 
unexpected response from many respondents indicated that the questionnaire was too 
difficult, while a few said that throughout the survey, they realized their ignorance of 
the events, and expressed interest in learning more about the relevant issues. These 
responses partly explain why conducting surveys like these is such a sensitive issue 
and largely forbidden in Mainland China, as the survey itself increases access to 
information and might potentially change the understanding and opinion of the 
respondents. The process of conducting the survey itself clearly demonstrated the 																																																																																																																																																														
crime/article/1877932/missing-presumed-detained-hong-kong-publishers-books; “A Few Hongkongers 
should not Cast Cloud over ‘One Country, Two Systems’”, Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) (4 January 
2016), p 15; “The Hong Kong Bookseller Incident was Media Hype” Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) 
(6 January 2016), p 14.  
8 The author first tried a widely-used survey website in Mainland China to distribute the questionnaire, 
but it was deleted by the administrator immediately after it was sent to the first respondent. Then, the 
author used SurveyMonkey, an electronic platform for collecting data, but it was too slow for those in 
Mainland China who could not open the survey webpage, so the author had to use another survey 
website based in Mainland China (jinshuju.net) to collect the data in private.    
9 Online chatting records on file with the author.  
 Table 1 Number of Respondents 
 	 	 Category Number of respondents 
1 Mainland Chinese  323 
2 Overseas Mainlanders 135 
    2.1        Mainlanders in Hong Kong 
      (mainly college students) 
            112 
    2.2        Mainlanders in Taiwan                          4 
    2.3       Mainlanders in Foreign Countries                          19 
3 Weiquan sector  20 
   
    Total                    478 
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following: sensitivity when discussing political issues; fear of disclosure and resultant 
self-censorship; apolitical and apathetic mentalities; the blocking of information; and 
also, the enthusiasm of a few Chinese individuals towards the issues surveyed. Each 
of these factors provided a glimpse into the political atmosphere and public 
consciousness within contemporary Chinese society.  
 
Limitations of Data Collection 
Due to issue sensitivity, the survey had to be privately conducted in a low-profile 
manner, and thus the questionnaires were first distributed among acquaintances based 
on personal relations through snowballing, which inevitably limited the number and 
type of respondents. Due to the lack of a public channel when conducting the survey 
some localities, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, are not covered. A large number of 
respondents have similar backgrounds to that of the author, particularly in terms of 
social status and age, which resulted in several major limitations. 
a. A large number of respondents came from middle class urban areas, while only 
a few peasants and workers from rural areas participated. Although the data 
might not be sufficient enough to demonstrate the difference in the opinions 
regarding the different classes, the opinions of the middle class may serve as an 
important indicator since they have long been expected to be an important force 
for democratization and legal development in transitional countries.10  The 
survey results on the attitudes of Overseas Mainlander Chinese towards the OC 
Movement was mainly sampled from college students in Hong Kong, as many 
Hong Kong universities have been significantly involved in the movement. 
Since most Mainland students in Hong Kong are postgraduates, this strongly 
influenced the demographic distribution in terms of respondent education level 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Education and Income-Level of Respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 																																																								
10  Another survey on political ideologies of Chinese also primarily concentrated on middle-class male 
elites, see Jennifer Pan & Yiqing Xu, “China’s Ideological Spectrum”, MIT Political Science 
Department Research Paper 2015-6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2593377, p 5.  
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Similarly, 91.6% of the respondents were between 20~39 years old (Figure 2), which 
means a vast segment of the population (those 40+) is underrepresented in this survey. 
While certainly constraining the data, this significant limitation should not lead one to 
disregard the study’s results, given that younger citizens with a college education or 
higher are the political and economic elites in China, and their opinions could have 
far-reaching influence on the prospects of Chinese democracy. It should also be noted 
that the gender distribution of those surveyed was roughly equal (see Figure 3).  
	 Figure 2 Age of Respondents                                Figure 3 Gender of Respondents 
 
 
 
 
            
 
     
   
    b. It is possible that many of the respondents who completed the questionnaire 
might be more knowledgeable of the two civil disobedience movements, as well more 
informed about political and social issues. Those who declined to complete the 
questionnaire might comprise part of the larger proportion of individuals who were 
afraid to do so, were apathetic or who strongly opposed the movements.  
    c. Another factor worth keeping in mind is that the survey was being conducted 
when the “Fish Ball” Incident11  took place in Hong Kong, which might have 
influenced the attitudes of Mainland Chinese towards social movements and rule of 
law in Hong Kong. Due to time limitations, the questionnaire did not solicit opinions 
on the “Fish Ball” Incident.  
 
Official Media Reports on the OC and Sunflower Movements 
Prior to discussing the survey’s findings, it is necessary to first briefly review the 
media coverage of the OC Movements in Mainland China for a general idea of how 
the state depicted this movement and the relevant issues.  
    The OC Movement, as well as the Sunflower Movement, occurred when the new 
central leadership led by President Xi Jinping (習近平) came forward and attempted 
to consolidate political power. Under the new central leadership, mass and social 
media have been subject to intensified monitoring,12 and the mainstream media has 
been more actively mobilized to propagate party ideology. Discussions over high-																																																								
11 The civil unrest of the so-called “fish ball” incident occurred on the night of 8 February 2016 until 
the next morning. The incident escalated from the government’s crackdown on unlicensed hawkers 
selling delicacies including fish balls (a popular Hong Kong street food) during the Lunar New Year 
holidays. Violent clashes broke out between police and protestors. See “Protesters and Police Clash at 
Chinese New Year Festivities in Hong Kong”, New York Times (8 February 2016), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/world/asia/protesters-and-police-clash-at-lunar-new-year-
festivities-in-hong-kong.html?_r=1.  
12  See Freedom House, “China: Freedom of the Press 2015”, available at https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/freedom-press/2015/china . 
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profile events are increasingly strictly prohibited compared to previous periods.13 On 
the other hand, the state-controlled media now plays a far more active role in response 
to high-profile issues, and constantly takes the moral high ground to denounce 
opinions unfavorable to the state.14 
    It was under this media environment in which the OC and Sunflower Movements 
were framed and reported in Mainland China.15 The China Media Project of Hong 
Kong University tracked daily reports on the OC Movement in the Chinese media. 
According to their publicized databases and the media reports I collected, most 
mainstream media and online news websites such as Sohu, Sina and Tencent, only 
cited the news releases from the Xinhua News Agency or the People’s Daily, sources 
which serve as the most authoritative “mouthpiece” of the state. The Chinese-
language Global Times (环球时报) is almost the only mainstream media outlet that 
published original reports or commentary articles on the OC and Sunflower 
Movements.  
   Based on the content analysis of the media reports, the media in Mainland China, 
generally speaking, formed an overarching anti-OC Movement frame. In sum, four 
distinct sub-frames were put forward, namely, the “hostile foreign forces” (境外敌对
势力) frame, the disorder/instability frame, the illegal nature frame, and the pro-
independence/nationalism frame; all were constructed by the mainstream media in 
China to extensively criticize the OC Movement.  
    (1) “Hostile foreign forces”: used by the state to stigmatize the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square Movement.16 By using the same tactic, the official media also accused the OC 
Movement of being manipulated by “hostile foreign forces”. The “hostile foreign 
forces” were constantly labeled as the “black hand” when official media reported on 
the OC Movement.17 
     (2) Disorder/instability: this frame includes several sub-themes about the OC 
Movement, including a negative impact on the Hong Kong economy18 (as well as 
how the Hong Kong economy has lagged behind other Mainland Chinese cities and 
suffered as a result of the movement), 19 the call by Hong Kong citizens to restore 
order, and the (supposed) chaos caused by the OC Movement.20 																																																								
13 Jacques deLisle et al., “Introduction: The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China”, in Jacques 
deLisle et al. (ed.), The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016), pp 14-5.  
14 E.g., see China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, Report on the 709 Crackdown (Hong Kong: 
China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, 2016). 
15 The	China Media Project of HKU has done excellent work in tracing the trends of media report on 
the OC Movement in Mainland China, available at http://cmp.hku.hk (visited 12 April 2016); also see 
Natalie Choi, “Perspective on the Occupy Central Demonstrations in Hong Kong: A Critical Discourse 
Analysis on English-language Press in Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan and China”, Master’s dissertation in 
Language Sciences, Stockholm University (2015), available at http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/ 
diva2:907318/FULLTEXT01.pdf.  
16 Qian Gang, “Foreign Forces’ in 1989” (21 Aug 2014), available at http://www.storm.mg/article/ 
23465.  
17 E.g., “Hong Kong Media Discloses Student Informers Supported by UK and US”,Huanqiu Shibao 
(Global Times) (21 September 2014), p 10; “Western Media Define Hong Kong’s ‘Occupy Central’ as 
A Color Revolution” Zhongguo Xinwen She (China News Service) (5 October 2014); Mo Jihong, “We 
Must Resolutely Chop Off the Black Hands Behind ‘Occupy Central’”, Zhongguo Wang (China.org.cn) 
(8 October 2016), available at http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_45_111045.html. 	
18 E.g., “‘Occupy Central’ Has a Serious Adverse Effect on the Economic Livelihood of Hong Kong”, 
Shenzhen Dushibao (Shenzhen Metropolis Daily) (30 September 2014), A02. 
19 E.g., “What’s Wrong with Hong Kong’s Economy?”, Caixin (05 October 2014), available at 
http://international.caixin.com/2014-10-05/100735335.html.  
20 E.g., “Occupy Central Severely Disturbs Social Orders in Hong Kong”, Shenzhen Dushibao 
(Shenzhen Metropolis Daily) (08 October 2014), A02.  
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     (3) Illegal nature frame. The media reports accentuated how the OC Movement 
violated the law, and some reports focused on the legal measures taken by the Hong 
Kong government as to how they handled the event and targeted OC participants. The 
media also covered commentary articles written by legal professionals who strongly 
denounced the movement, while articles written by liberal intellectuals or others 
inclined to support the OC Movement were blocked in the official mass media and 
could only be accessed through social media, some of which disappeared soon 
afterwards.21 
     (4) Pro-independence/nationalism frame. This depiction of the OC Movement is 
mainly constructed of two sub-themes: the emergence of a pro-Hong Kong 
independence movement, and comparing the current situation with colonial Hong 
Kong. News reports and commentaries indicated that Hong Kong locals never asked 
for democracy during the colonial period under British rule and now, after the 1997 
handover, enjoy more democracy.22 The official media also highlighted how the 
central government and Mainland China have supported economic development in 
Hong Kong, 23 and emphasized the importance of tourists from Mainland China in 
contributing to the Hong Kong economy.24 
    On social media, such as the two most widely used—Sina Weibo (Chinese version 
of Twitter) and the “Wechat Moments” (微信朋友圈)—postings that documented 
what was happening at the sites of the OC Movement disappeared almost as quickly 
as they appeared (this also applied to any pro-OC Movement postings). The 
authorities even applied a technical measure to block postings by overseas Wechat 
users in the later stages of the OC Movement: Wechat users in the Mainland were 
blocked from getting access to the postings on “Wechat Moments” of their overseas 
friends, but this did not deter overseas users from uploading or reading postings on 
any other Wechat account.25 According to the China Media Project, a search of “Hong 
Kong” on Weibo during the protests returned “mostly entertainment, finance and 
tourism related results, with odd scattered results including mention of the protests”.26 
 
Major Findings of the Survey 
General Attitudes: Large gap between Weiquan sector and ordinary Mainlanders  
The statistical results echo the impression that Chinese Mainlanders, in general, are 
inclined to hold negative attitudes towards the OC Movement, in which an average of 
53.7% (n=246) of Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlander respondents are 																																																								
21 E.g., “‘Occupy Central’ is not A Normal Way for Expression Freedom”, Renmin Ribao (People’s 
Daily) (2 October 2014), p 4; Zou Pingxue, “‘Occupy Central’ Severely Impairs the Rule of Law 
Tradition of Hong Kong in Three Aspects”, Xinhuawang (Xinhuanet) (3 October 2014), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/talking/2014-10/03/c_1112710063.htm; also see Mo (n 17 above). 
22 E.g., “Former British Senior Officer: It’s Hypocritical for UK and US to Criticize China Hong Kong 
Pro-Democratic Not Pursuing Democracy”, Renminwang (People.cn) (4 September 2014), available at 
http://hm.people.com.cn/n/2014/0904/c42272-25601482.html.  
23 E.g., “10 Questions About Hong Kong ‘Occupy Central’”(香港“占中”十问), Zhongguo Xinwen She 
(China News Service) (3 October 2014), available at http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/10-
03/6649570.shtml.  
24 Xie Xiyu et al., “Occupy Central Impact Hong Kong Tourism and Hong Kong Tourism Sectors are 
Worried”, Xinhuawang (Xinhuanet) (14 October 2014), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/gangao/ 
2014-10/14/c_1112824706.htm.  
25 Based on my personal experience and confirmation with other mainlanders living in Hong Kong. 
This measure is also mentioned in an online article that details how posts on Weixin are censored, see 
Qing Zijin, “Test: How Weixin Contents are Censored” (4 February 2015), available at https://pao-
pao.net/article/357.  
26 David Bandurski, “China’s Selective Silence on Hong Kong” China Media Project (29 September 
2014), available at	http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/29/36250/.		
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opposed or strongly opposed to the OC Movement. Unsurprisingly, this is in sharp 
contrast with the attitude of the Weiquan sector, as only two respondents were 
opposed to the OC Movement and 85% (n=17) supported the cause (including 50% 
with strong support). In contrast, only 11.8% (n=38) of Mainland Chinese and 19.3% 
(n=46) of the Overseas Mainlanders have a positive attitude towards the OC 
Movement (see Table 2 and Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 Respondents general opinion of OC Movement (n=478) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Mainlanders’ General Attitudes toward the OC Movement 
Category Strongly 
support 
Somewhat 
Support 
Indifferent 
/Don’t know 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Strongly 
Oppose 
1. Mainland 
Chinese 
11.8% 32.8% 
 
55.4% 
1.5% 10.3% 34.7% 20.7% 
2. Overseas 
Mainlanders 
19.3% 31% 
 
49.7% 
3.0% 16.3% 37.8% 11.9% 
3. Weiquan 
Sector 
85% 5% 
 
10% 
50% 35% 10% 0 
 
    As for the Sunflower Movement, all of the respondents in the three categories 
demonstrated even less knowledge or concern of that movement, compared to the OC 
Movement. As many as 77.1% (n=249) of the Mainland Chinese and nearly 66.7% 
(n=90) of the Overseas Mainlanders displayed indifference or had no idea about the 
Sunflower Movement, while only 25% (n=5) of the respondents from the Weiquan 
sector displayed indifference about the movement. Nevertheless, the pattern as 
regards support/opposition is largely similar to that of the OC Movement. In terms of 
the Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders, those with a negative attitude 
(15.8% (n=51) and 18.5% (n=25), respectively) still somewhat outnumbered the 
supporters. Only one respondent from the Weiquan sector was opposed to the 
Sunflower movement. A majority (70%) of the respondents from the Weiquan Sector 
tended to support the Sunflower Movement, but this is true for only 7.1% (n=23) of 
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Mainland Chinese and 14.9% (n=20) of Overseas Mainlanders (See Figure 5 and 
Table 3).  
 
Figure 5 General Opinion of Respondents about Sunflower Movement (n = 478) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Mainlanders’ General Attitudes towards the Sunflower Movement 
Category Strongly support Support 
Indifferent/ 
Don’t know Oppose 
Strongly 
Oppose 
1. Mainland 
Chinese 
7.1%  77.1%  
 
15.8% 
 0 7.1%  12.4% 3.4% 
      
2. Overseas 
Mainlanders  
14.9% 66.6 %  
 
18.5%  
3.0%  11.9% 14.8% 3.7% 
      
3. Weiquan 
Sector 
70% 25%  
 
5% 
30% 40% 5% 0 
 
No Significant Correlation between “Overseas Locality” and Attitude towards the 
OC Movement 
The survey showed that that there was no significant difference between the attitudes 
of Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders (P > .05). However there was a mild 
correlation between “overseas locality” and attitude towards the Sunflower Movement 
(P < .05). A possible reason for the difference might be that most of the Overseas 
Mainland Chinese living in Hong Kong directly felt the negative effects of the OC 
Movement, and were thus more inclined to oppose it; all the while supporting the 
Sunflower Movement, of which they did not feel any direct effects. 
    In addition to the insignificant difference between the attitudes of Mainland 
Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders towards the OC Movement, another indicator of 
the influence of locality is the significant correlation between the localities and 
whether the respondents think that the OC Movement was influenced by “foreign 
forces” (p=.001). Significantly less Overseas Mainlanders (39.3%, n=53) accept that 
there were “foreign forces” behind the OC Movement, compared to the beliefs of 
Mainland Chinese (55.1%, n=178) (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 (Q10): Do you think that OC was influenced by “foreign forces”? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
     
 
 
To some extent this contrast indicates that the depiction of the influence of foreign 
forces on the OC Movement by state media had an effective impact in shaping the 
views of Mainland Chinese. The survey data also demonstrates that the Hong Kong 
media was the primary source of information for Overseas Mainlanders, who relied 
much less on the official mass media of Mainland China (only 14.8%, n=20). In 
contrast, official news reports were the primary source for Mainland Chinese 
respondents when accessing Hong Kong news. The media sources of the Weiquan 
sector also presented a striking contrast with Mainland Chinese, as their primary 
media source for overseas information was obtained by “climbing over the wall”, i.e., 
using private virtual networks/proxy servers to access the internet (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4 Top Three Media or information Sources for Respondents 
Category 1: Mainland Chinese (n = 323) 
1. Social media:                                                 53.6% 
2. News websites*:                                            50.8%  (Official news***: 85.5%) 3. Official mass media**:                                  34.7% 
Category 2: Overseas Mainlanders (n = 135) 
1 Hong Kong Media:                                        64.4% 
2 Social Media:                                                 54.1% 
3 News websites:                                              28.1% 
Category 3: Weiquan Sector (n = 20) 
1 “Climb over the wall” for overseas news:     65% 
2 Social media:                                                 55% 
3 Hong Kong media:                                        40% 
* “News websites” refers to major Internet and commercial media, such as Sohu.com, Sina.com, and 
Tencent.com (see Question 19, Appendix Questionnaire), which are strictly monitored by the state.  
** “Official mass media” refers to state-controlled mainstream media, such as The People’s Daily, 
China Central Television (CCTV), Global Times, and local newspapers (see Question 19, Appendix 
Questionnaire). 
*** As mentioned, regarding the matter of Occupy Central, China’s news websites almost exclusively 
cited news releases from official sources; therefore, both news websites and the official mass media are 
classified as “official news” here.  
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Significant Correlation between Media Sources and Attitudes towards the OC 
Movement  
Compared to the localities, there was a significant correlation between media sources 
and respondents’ attitudes towards the OC Movement (see Table 5 & 6).  
1. Different Media Sources of Mainland Chinese Respondents (Category 1) 
If media sources are categorized into three different groups, such as: 1) official news, 
2) overseas information sources, and 3) social media, then supporters and opponents 
of the OC Movement in Mainland China relied on different resources for obtaining 
Hong Kong news (Table 6). Overseas information sources were the primary media 
source of Mainland Chinese respondents who held a more sympathetic view towards 
the OC Movement. In contrast, “official news”, which consists of news from the 
official PRC mass media and news websites, constituted the most important 
information source, along with social media, for Mainland Chinese respondents 
opposed to the OC Movement (see Table 5).  
     There was also a large gap between the use of “climbing-over-the-wall” software 
to gain overseas information between supporters and opponents of the OC Movement 
in Mainland China, as only 7.7% (n=19) of those opposed to the OC Movement did 
this for information, in contrast to the 50% (n=32) who supported the OC Movement 
(see Table 5).  
2. Media Sources of Overseas Mainlanders (Category 2) 
Table 7 shows that the major sources of obtaining HK information for Mainland 
Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders are significantly different, as over half of the latter 
relied on the Hong Kong media as their primary source, while most of former relied 
on news sources from within Mainland China.  
 
Table 5 Primary Sources of HK Information: Supporters vs. Opponents in Mainland 
China 
 (Q 19: Please choose the three major media sources that you use to obtain Hong 
Kong news) 
Respondents Official News  Overseas Information sources Social Media 
 Official Mass 
Media 
News 
websites 
Circumvent 
Firewall 
Friends 
in HK 
HK 
Media 
 
Supporters 15.8% 21.1% 55.3% 21.1% 26.3% 68.4% 
Opponents  39.1% 62.6% 6.1% 16.8% 14.5% 56.4% 
 
Table 6  Chi-Square Correlations between Media Source and Attitude towards the OC 
Movement (excluding Weiquan Sector)(n=458) 
 Attitude toward the OC movement 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Oppose Indifferent Support Strongly 
Support 
Don’t 
Know 
Official Mass 
Media 48.2% 27% 27.9% 12.7% 0 27% 
News 
Websites 50.6% 57.7% 36.9% 18.2% 0 40.5% 
Social Media 45.8% 61.3% 53.2% 58.2% 77.8% 27% 
Hong Kong 28.9% 27.6% 30.6% 47.3% 44.4% 5.4% 
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Media 
“Climb over 
the Wall” 8.4% 7.4% 12.6% 52.7% 33.3% 2.7% 
Pearson Chi-Square Tests 
                                                       Attitude toward the OC Movement 
Media        Chi-Square  166.452     
                   df 25     
                  Sig. .000     
 
Table 7 Different Media Sources of Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders  
Media Locality 
 Overseas Mainlanders Mainland Chinese 
Official Media 14.8% 34.7% 
News Websites 28.1% 50.8% 
Social Media 54.1% 53.6% 
HK Media 64.4% 14.9% 
“Climb over the Wall” 17.8% 13.0% 
Information from friends in 
HK 
                   25.2%                                         17.3% 
Pearson Chi-Square Tests 
 Locality   
Media    Chi-square     148.021  
               df                5  
               Sig.           .000  
 
    Among Overseas Mainlanders, there was also a significant correlation between 
media sources and attitude, as the 76.9% (n=20) who supported the OC Movement 
used the Hong Kong media as their primary source of information, in contrast to the 
64.2% (n=43) who were opposed to the OC Movement. In terms of the latter, the 
official news sources in Mainland China remained one of their primary sources even 
if they were residing outside of China, while only 3.8% (n=1) of the Overseas 
Mainlanders who supported the OC Movement used the official mass media for 
information. In general, including other resources such as “climbing over the wall”27 
and news from Hong Kong friends, overseas news was the dominant information 
source for Overseas Mainlanders who supported the OC Movement, along with social 
media (50.0%, n=13). In contrast, their reliance on official news from Mainland 
China was almost negligible. However, Overseas Mainlanders who opposed to the 
OC Movement relied almost the same on the three major sources for news on Hong 
Kong: official news from Mainland China (56.7%, n=38), Hong Kong media sources 
(64.2%, n=43), and social media (55.2%, n=37). 
    Further analysing the spectrum of Hong Kong media that Mainlanders accessed 
demonstrated no salient correlation between Hong Kong media and attitudes towards 
the OC Movement (P => .05). Nevertheless, few Mainlanders, even those opposed to 
the OC Movement, read the pro-establishment newspapers, such as the Takungpao 
(大公报) and Wenweipo (文汇报). In the neutral or liberal zone, such as the South 
China Morning Post (SCMP) and Apple Daily newspapers, the number of supporters 
was slightly higher than those who were opposed to the OC Movement (see Figure 7). 
 																																																								
27 Overseas mainlanders might also use a VPN to climb over the firewall when they return to Mainland 
China.	
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Figure 7 Hong Kong Media Sources Frequently Accessed by Mainlanders 
(Q 20: which Hong Kong media source do you most frequently access?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
    It is worth noting that both Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders who 
either supported or opposed the OC Movement strongly relied on social media for 
information, which explains why the Chinese government has further increased their 
control over these channels in recent years, particularly when high-profile events, 
such as the OC Movement, take place.  
    The findings contrast with a statement made by Andrew Nathan in the mid-1980s 
that media usage has little to do with political participation or political competence. It 
may be partly due to his sample and partly because of the more open public 
discussion over democracy and political reform during the 1980s.28 During that period, 
even the official print media openly discussed political reform and the information 
sources were not as diversified as those of contemporary China. 
 
Negative Correlations between Perceptions of “Foreign Forces” and Attitudes 
towards OC  
As previously mentioned, “foreign forces” were framed as the villain in interpreting 
the OC Movement, both by the official media in Mainland China as well as the leftist 
media in Hong Kong. The survey showed that 55.1% (n=178) of Mainland Chinese 
and 39.3% (n=53) of Overseas Mainlanders believed that the OC Movement was 
influenced by foreign forces, in contrast to the 20% (n=4) of the Weiquan sector. 
More importantly, respondents from the Weiquan sector do not necessarily consider 
foreign forces as a negative reason to oppose the OC Movement. Among the four 
respondents from the Weiquan sector who acknowledged the influence of “foreign 
forces”, none are opposed to the OC Movement. In contrast, for the other respondents 
there was a significant correlation between agreeing that “foreign forces” had an 
influence and overall attitude towards the OC Movement (p=.001). For other 																																																								
28 Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp 251-53. 
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participants, however, “foreign forces” were an important reason for opposing the OC 
Movement. Among the Overseas Mainlanders who believed that “foreign forces” had 
an effect, 79.2% (n=42) were opposed or strongly opposed to the OC Movement, 
while among Mainland Chinese, the percentage was almost the same (78.6%, 
n=140)(see Table 9). 
    The difference in attitudes vividly illustrates how differently the Weiquan sector 
and other Mainlanders perceive foreign factors. “Foreign forces” to the former might 
be a comrade or facilitator for causes and social movements, while for the latter, 
“foreign forces” are hostile to China (as propagandised by the state media). 
 
Table 8 Influence by Foreign Forces (n=478) 
(Q10: Do you think that the OC Movement was influenced by “foreign forces”?) 
 Very much Somewhat Neutral Not much Not at all 
1.Mainland 
Chinese 
55.1%  24.7%  
 
20.2% 
22.9% 32.2%  14.6% 5.6%  
2. Overseas 
Mainlanders 
39.3% 30.4% 
 
30.3% 
8.9% 30.4% 20.7% 9.6% 
3. Weiquan 
Sector  
20% 15%  65% 
10 % 10%  30%  35% 
 
 
 
Table 9 Attitude of Respondents who Acknowledged Influence of “Foreign Forces” 
 toward OC Movement (n=478) 
 Strongly 
support Support 
Indifferent 
/Don’t know Oppose 
Strongly 
Oppose 
1. Mainland 
Chinese  
1.7% 19.7%  78.6% 
0 1.7% 44.9% 33.7% 
2. Overseas 
Mainlanders  
1.9% 18.9% 79.2% 
0 1.9%  50.9% 28.3% 
3. Weiquan 
Sector  
75%  25%  0 
25%  50%  0 0 
 
A Complicated Picture: Consciousness of Democracy vs. Rule of Law 
This survey demonstrated an interesting but complicated phenomenon: the 
consciousness of democracy and the rule of law of Chinese in Mainland China.    
     (1) Most mainlanders in general do not reject but are instead pragmatic about 
democracy, and in particular they are practical about the pro-democracy movements, 
which is consistent with previous findings.29 Rather than viewing democracy as an 
independent and desirable political ideal, most are more concerned with the 
ineffectiveness or impact that might be brought about by democracy and democratic 
movements. 																																																								
29 E.g., Che-po Chan, “The Political Pragmatism of Chinese University Students,” Suisheng Zhao ed. 
China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China (Routledge, 2014), p 223; 
Andrew J. Nathan, “The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle Class” (2016) 2 Journal of Democracy 15; Pan 
& Xu (n 10 above).  
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    First, for most ordinary Mainlanders, democracy itself can hardly stand alone as a 
desirable ideology which deserves to be pursued. These citizens also project their own 
thoughts onto Hong Kong locals: only a small proportion of mainlanders (most of 
them who support the OC Movement) believe that the OC Movement was caused by 
the desire of Hong Kong citizens for democracy, while most of them believe that 
current social and economic problems in Hong Kong were the primary reasons. This 
contrasts with findings on the motivations of Hong Kong locals who participated in 
the OC Movement. Empirical studies show that the demand for democracy was the 
primary reason for 87% of Hong Kong participants who took part in the OC 
Movement, while the other two major reasons were government apathy towards the 
demands of the protesters and the way that the police handled the event.30 Economic 
improvement is not given as an important reason for participating in the OC 
Movement.31 
    Secondly, the survey found that few Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders 
are opposed to the OC Movement because they think that Hong Kong should not 
adopt a “western style democracy” (10.1%, n=18) Mainland Chinese and 9.5% (n=4) 
Overseas Mainlanders). The three highest ranked reasons for opposing to the OC 
Movement were mainly concerned with practical social and economic issues, 
including: the negative effect on social-economic development in Hong Kong (68.3%, 
n=168), deepening divisions within society (62.6%, n=154), and the overly radical 
strategy of Occupying Central (58.5%, n=144).  
    Thirdly, individuals who were opposed to the OC Movement did not necessarily 
oppose its agenda of universal suffrage. While 53.7% (n=246) of Mainland Chinese 
and Overseas Mainlanders were opposed to the OC Movement, only 29.5% (n=135) 
were opposed to its agenda of universal suffrage (see Figure 8). To some extent, this 
finding echoes a survey by Lianjiang Li, which showed that over 85% of the 
respondents agreed that, in principle, the township head should be popularly elected, 
and over 65% of the respondents agreed that the state chairman should be elected 
through ordinary democratic voting.32  
	
Figure 8 Comparison between Attitudes Toward the OC Movement and  
the Agenda of Universal Suffrage (excluding Weiquan sector) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
30 Yuen & Cheng (n 1 above).  
31 Ibid.  32 Lianjiang Li, “Right Consciousness and Rules Consciousness in contemporary China” (2010) 64 The 
China Journal 47, 59.	
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Table 10 Attitudes Towards the OC Movement and the Agenda of Universal Suffrage 
(excluding Weiquan sector) 
 The OC Movement      The agenda of the OC:       Universal Suffrage 
Support (incl. strongly 
support)  
14% 36.9% 
Oppose (incl. strongly oppose) 53.7% 29.5% 
Indifferent 24.2% 18.6% 
Don’t know 8.1% 15% 
 
    A large proportion of the respondents are opposed to the OC Movement because 
they disagree with its radical actions, as opposed to its agenda. As Figure 9 shows, 
among the opponents of the OC Movement, less than half were opposed to universal 
suffrage, and 21.1% (n=52) even gave their approval. If respondents who were 
indifferent to universal suffrage or did not know what universal suffrage meant are 
excluded, the percentage who gave their approval is as high as 55.6%. Among those 
who were opposed to the OC Movement but agreed with universal suffrage, the 
highest-ranking reason for their opposition was the radical actions of the OC 
Movement (67.3%, n=35). Only seven of them were opposed to the OC Movement 
for the reasons that Hong Kong should not implement a western-style democracy 
(n=2) or that Hong Kong has enjoyed more democracy compared to its colonial 
period (n=5).  
 
Figure 9 Attitude of OC opponents towards Universal Suffrage  
(Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (2) There was a significant negative correlation between nationalism and attitude 
towards democracy and pro-democratic movements. 
     As the analysis above indicated, there was a negative correlation between whether 
a respondent accepted “foreign forces” as the culprit behind the OC Movement and 
the attitude of respondents towards the OC Movement, as well as his/her perception 
of democracy.  
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    There was a significant gap between the supporters and opponents of the OC 
Movement on whether they agreed that there were “foreign forces” involved, in which 
74% (n=182) of those mainlanders who felt negatively towards the OC Movement 
believed that it was influenced by “foreign forces”, while this was the case for only 
6.3% (n=4) of those who supported the OC Movement. 
     There was also a gap in the acceptance of the influence of “foreign forces” and 
“nationalism sentiment” between the Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders. 
While the majority of the former indicated that the involvement of the pro-
independence forces in Hong Kong and foreign forces were reasons for opposing the 
OC Movement, less than half of the latter indicated these two factors as the primary 
reasons for opposing the OC Movement; and only 35.8% (n=24) of Overseas 
Mainlanders indicated that the involvement of the pro-independence forces in Hong 
Kong was a reason for their opposition, whereas this was a factor for 50.3% (n=90) of 
Mainland Chinese respondents (see Table 11).  
 
Table 11  Primary Reasons for Opposing the OC Movement 
Mainland Chinese  Overseas Chinese 
Rank Reason Rank 
1st   
65.9% Impairs economic and social development in HK 
2nd 
74.6% 
2nd  
59.8% The strategy of occupying central is too radical  
3rd 
55.2% 
3rd 
57.5% Deepens social division 
1st 
76.1% 
4th  
52.0% 
Intervention of “foreign forces” 4th 
55.2% 
5th 
50.3% 
Involvement of pro-independence forces in HK 5th 
35.8% 
6th 
16.8% 
HK already enjoys enough democracy and 
freedom compared to its colonial period 
6th 
9% 
7th 
10.1% 
No need to implement Western democratic 
election 
7th 
7.5% 
8th 
2.2% Other 
8th 
3% 
  
    (3) The rule of law is more valued than democracy, and while the ideal of 
democracy might be valued, pro-democratic movements are not.  
    Compared to the democratic movement, the respondents in general demonstrated a 
more supportive attitude towards the rule of law, as indicated by their different 
attitudes towards the OC Movement and the Lee Bo incident.33 If the respondents 																																																								
33 Five staff of a causeway bookstore in Hong Kong were reportedly “forced to disappear” in early 
2016 for planning to publish a book on President Xi Jinping’s private life. They were later found to be 
detained in Mainland China since October 2015. One bookseller named Lee Bo was last seen in Hong 
Kong and later found to have crossed the Chinese border without travel documents. Lee’s 
disappearance and the detention of the five booksellers caused widespread concern that the Chinese 
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who were did not know about the Lee Bo incident are excluded, the percentage who 
were opposed to the arrest of Lee Bo is as high as 58.6% (n=143). Violation of the 
law and the “one country two systems” policy were the highest ranking reasons for 
opposing the arrest of the five booksellers, although the official media has also 
portrayed the Lee Bo incident to involve “foreign forces”.34 Even among those who 
were opposed to the OC Movement, 41.2% (n=49) were still opposed to the arrest of 
Lee Bo (not including those who were indifferent or did not know about the Lee Bo 
incident). Among the respondents who supported the arrest of Lee Bo, only 8.1% 
(n=5) believed that there was involvement of foreign forces, and 40.3% (n=25) felt 
that Mainland Chinese authorities handled the case according to the law.  
     As discussed above, the survey demonstrated that even those opposed to the OC 
Movement did not necessarily reject the idea of true democratic elections. Forty-six of 
the respondents were opposed to the OC Movement but agreed on its agenda of 
universal suffrage, and their primary reasons for opposing the movement were social 
and economic concerns, rather than anti-democratic concerns. This demonstrates that, 
like many Hong Kong locals, a substantial proportion of Mainland Chinese were also 
opposed to the strategies utilized by the OC Movement, instead of its agenda for 
democracy.35  
 
Conclusion: Generalisation of Findings and Implications 
Gap between Mainland Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders  
There are often discussions about the phenomenon in which overseas young Chinese 
elites return to China only to hold nationalistic and negative attitudes towards liberal 
democracies.36 This survey demonstrates that overseas experience has a certain degree 
of correlation with attitudes towards democracy and democratic movements, although 
the impact did not reach statistical significance. Nevertheless, Overseas Mainlander 
Chinese in this study were less influenced by the framing of “foreign forces” by 
Chinese state propaganda outlets, a finding which was largely attributed to the local 
media and information overseas that they were able to access. However there was 
almost no difference between the Overseas Mainlanders who still strongly relied on 
official news sources from the Mainland, with their counterparts living in Mainland 
China. This finding indirectly demonstrates the effect of state propaganda controlled 
by Chinese authorities.  
 
Effectiveness of State Propaganda on Shaping Public Consciousness in Mainland 
China 
																																																																																																																																																														
authorities had violated the Basic Law and infringed the basic rights of Hong Kong citizens. See 
“Timeline: Hong Kong’s Missing Bookseller and What We Know So Far”, South China Morning Post 
(1 March 2016), available at http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/1903405/ 
timeline-hong-kongs-missing-booksellers-and-what-we-know-so.  
34 Global Times, “A Few Hongkongers should not Cast Cloud over ‘One Country Two Systems’” (n 7 
above).  
35 According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of the University of 
Hong Kong in April 2013, 35 per cent Hong Kong respondents opposed the electoral reform proposal 
backed by Beijing, while only 25 per cent supported the OC Movement. The result of the poll is 
available at https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/report/mpCEnOCC/index.html.  
36 See Rowena Xiaoqing He, “Identifying with a ‘Rising China’? Overseas Chinese Student 
Nationalism, ” in Edward Vickers and Krishna Kumar (ed.), Constructing Modern Asian Citizenship 
(New York: Routledge), pp 314-40.  
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State propaganda has been effective in shaping the opinions of Chinese citizens 
towards high-profile events, including public consciousness as regards social 
movements and democracy. The use of “foreign forces” and “nationalism sentiments” 
to frame these events as constructed by the official media has been successful, 
particularly within Mainland China. The state-led nationalism frame in the case of the 
OC Movement, as well as the Sunflower Movement, fits with what Comaroff and 
Stern described as the “out-ward-directed sentiments that heap hostility upon 
others”, 37  and such outward-directed nationalism has had an obvious negative 
correlation with Chinese people’s opinions on pro-democracy campaigning in Hong 
Kong.  
    Nevertheless, the survey also demonstrates good possibilities that access to 
different information sources may change individual opinions and help counteract 
state propaganda. However, the slight difference in the attitudes between Mainland 
Chinese and Overseas Mainlanders, and the salient differences between the 
respondents who have access to different information sources, demonstrate that it is 
not the locality that is crucial, but whether initiative is taken to obtain information on 
those matters. As a Chinese intellectual Zhou Lian pointed out, 
 
“Except for the two different kinds of futures predicted by Orwell and Huxley, 
there might be a third possibility that: on the one hand people are forbidden to 
read while on the other hand they automatically stop reading any more; on the 
one hand they are deprived of obtaining information, on the other hand they 
are flooded by the sea of garbage information; on the one hand the truth is 
concealed while on the other hand the truth is being submerged…” 38 
 
Positive and Negative Sides of Chinese Consciousness toward Democracy and the 
Rule of Law 
The survey accentuates the dichotomy between the consciousness of democracy and 
the rule of law. On the positive side, few Chinese are opposed to the idea of 
democracy. Many respondents opposed to the OC Movement did not oppose 
universal suffrage, and few believed that Hong Kong should not implement a 
“western-style democracy.” Most of the respondents were opposed to the OC 
Movement because they felt that it had negative social and economic repercussions.  
    Moreover, a relatively high rate of opposition to the Lee Bo incident demonstrates 
that Chinese citizens place high value on the rule of law. It appears here that 
nationalism is much less effective in impacting views regarding the rule of law. 
Nevertheless, the negative correlation between attitudes towards the rule of law and 
democracy casts doubt over what Pei Minxin states: that rights consciousness has 
become a crucial driver of “democratic resistance”.39 It seems that for most ordinary 
Chinese citizens, there is no connection between democracy and a guarantee of the 
rule of law and individual rights.  
      For those who are keen to see a democratic transition for China, the findings of 
this research also provides a gloomy side to the public consciousness of democracy 																																																								
37 John L. Comaroff & Paul Stern, “New Perspectives on Nationalism and War,” in John L. Comaroff 
& Paul C. Stern (eds.) Perspectives on Nationalism and War (Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 1995), p 
4.  
38 Zhou Lian, Zhengyi de Keneng (Possibility of Justice) (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi chubanshe, 2015), 
p 22. 
39 Pei Minxin, “Rights and Resistance: the Changing Context of the Dissident Movement,” in Elizabeth 
Perry and Mark Selden (eds.), Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), pp 32-56.  
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and political movements. The survey demonstrates that the views of democracy for 
Chinese people remain quite pragmatic and utilitarian. For the large number of 
Mainlander respondents in this study, the value of democracy is weighed against other 
values and elements, such as social welfare and economic development.  
    This study accentuates that besides nationalism, pragmatism is another important 
factor that negatively correlates with Chinese citizens’ opinions of democratic 
movements and democracy. Social and economic stability and development are the 
principle standards for ordinary Chinese citizens in evaluating democratic movements 
and democracy, even though some of them approve of democratic arrangements, such 
as universal suffrage. To a certain extent, the findings echo Havel’s argument that the 
post-totalitarian system is built on “foundations laid by the historical encounter 
between dictatorship and the consumer society”. 40  The willingness of ordinary 
Chinese citizens to surrender higher values when faced with material certainties also 
probably contributed to the adaptability of the authoritarian system in China.41 
 
Implications for the Weiquan Sector and Civil Societies in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
With regard to the consciousness of democracy and the rule of law, the gap between 
the consciousness of the Weiquan sector and ordinary Chinese citizens was, 
unsurprisingly, strikingly large. The ordinary Chinese middle-class people might be 
called “realists”,42 while the members of Weiquan sector are probably the rare but 
active idealists in Chinese society. Under nationalism sentiments, the tension between 
Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong societies has intensified during and after the OC 
Movement.43 In contrast, the Weiquan sector, along with a small proportion of 
ordinary citizens, share the same pro-democracy stance as the participants in the OC 
Movement. The crackdown on China’s weiquan sector before and after the OC 
Movement has further driven weiquan activists to the social movement sector (SMS) 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Since they are facing the same “common authoritarian 
enemy”, the SMS and rights activism groups in the three regions have increasingly 
interacted with each other.44  
     In the face of increasing aggressiveness from the Chinese party-state, the coalitions 
among civil societies in the three regions are important forces for resisting the 
influence and infiltration of authoritarianism in the three regions. As Andrew Nathan 
pointed out, there has been an increasingly negative impact of China’s 
authoritarianism on global democratization,45 so it is unsurprising that Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, two neighbours of Mainland China, feel the most direct influence of its 
power. The rights advocacy sector of the civil society, regardless whether it is in 
Mainland China or Hong Kong or Taiwan, comprises the crucial players for resisting 
the expansion of authoritarian power.46 																																																								
40 See Vaclav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” in Vaclav Havel et al. (eds.), The Power of the 
Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (New York: Sharpe, 1985), p 38.   
41 Generally see Nathan (n 29 above). 
42 Ibid, p 15.  
43 See Lily Kuo, “The Uglier Side of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement Pits Chinese against Chinese”, 
Quartz (3 November 2014), available at http://qz.com/290228/the-uglier-side-of-hong-kongs- 
umbrella-movement-pits-chinese-against-chinese/; also see Public Opinion Programme of the 
University of Hong Kong, “HKU POP Release Latest Survey on Hong Kong People’s Ethnic Identity” 
(22 December 2014), available at https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1211.html. 
44 See Hung Ho-fung & Iam-chong Ip, “Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement and the Making of 
China’s Offshore Civil Society” (2012) 3 Asian Survey 504.  
45 Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Challenge” (2015) 1 Journal of Democracy 156-70. 
46 As Jiunn Rong Yeh also pointed out, the primary underlying issue of the Sunflower Movement was 
the increased engagement across the Taiwan Strait, and that “the transformation to civic 
constitutionalism in the light of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement bears tremendous significance … to 
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     However, the mobilization of a wider sector of civil society in Mainland China has 
long been a vital but difficult issue for activists. This is now also a problem for the 
civil societies in Hong Kong and Taiwan which they need to take into consideration 
when discussing the promotion of democracy in the two regions, and which is 
inevitably associated with the development of law and democracy in Mainland China. 
Improving democratic consciousness and counteracting state propaganda are still 
challenging tasks for the Weiquan sector in contemporary China. In fact, this study 
shows that the prospect of mobilizing support for legal development seems to be more 
promising in current Chinese society.  
    It is hoped that this study helps to enrich current understanding regarding the public 
consciousness of democracy and the rule of law in contemporary China. More 
importantly, this study may also evoke discussions on the development of democracy 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan into a larger context that incorporates ordinary Chinese 
citizens and the Weiquan sector in Chinese civil society. Ultimately, the public 
consciousness of democracy and law is vital to the trajectory of democracy and rule 
of law in Mainland China, which inevitably influences events in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. After all, “nothing is stronger than an idea whose time has come”.47 
  
																																																																																																																																																														
China and Hong Kong”, see “Marching Towards Civic Constitutionalism with Sunflowers” (2015) 45 
Hong Kong Law Journal 315, 329.  
47 An oft-quoted saying paraphrased from “[a]n invasion of armies can be resisted; an invasion of ideas 
cannot be resisted.” Victor Hugo, History of a Crime: The Testimony of an Eye-Witness (translated by 
T. H. Joyce and Arthur Locker, New York: Mondial, 2005), pp 408-9. 
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Appendix Questionnaire (Originally supplied in Chinese to all participants) 
 
1. Do you know about the OC movement? 
☐very well     ☐somewhat     ☐not much      ☐not at all 	
2. Do you know about the universal suffrage and political reform in Hong Kong? 
☐very well     ☐somewhat     ☐not much      ☐not at all 	
3. Please choose the members of the “Occupy Central Trio” (choose 1to 3 
individuals): 
☐Jasper Tsang Yok-sing (曾鈺成)   ☐Benny Tai Yiu-ting(戴耀廷)	
☐Leung Chun-ying (梁振英) 														☐Eric Tat Ming Cheung (张达明)   				
☐Chan Kin Man (陈健民)  																	☐Joshua Wong (黄之锋)    
☐Chu Yiu-ming (朱耀明)																						☐Raymond Wong Yuk-man (黄毓民)  				
☐Leung Kwok-hung(梁国雄) 													☐Jimmy Lai Chee-ying(黎智英)        
☐Don’t know		
4. Do you know about the white paper on Hong Kong issues released by the State 
Council in 2014? 
☐very well     ☐somewhat     ☐not much      ☐not at all 
 
5. How do you feel about the OC movement? 
☐Strongly support (please go to Q7)         
☐Support (please go to Q7)        	
☐Neutral (please go to Q7)         
☐Oppose (please go to Q6)        
☐Strongly oppose (please go to Q6)						
☐Don’t know (please go to Q7)         	
6. Main reasons for opposing the Occupy Central movement： 
☐No need to implement Western-style democratic election	
☐Hong Kong already enjoys enough democracy and freedom compared to its 
colonial period	
☐Involvement of pro-independence forces in Hong Kong	
☐Impairs economic and social development in Hong Kong		
☐Deepens social division	
☐The strategy of occupying central is too radical  
☐Involvement of overseas forces	
☐Other 
 
7. Do you agree with the demands of the Occupy Central movement, i.e., to 
implement genuine universal suffrage so that candidates from the establishment or the 
pan-democratic campaigns can run for elections? 
☐Strongly agree     ☐agree   ☐indifferent   ☐oppose   ☐strongly oppose 
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☐don’t know 
 
8. Do you agree that the Hong Kong police should have fired tear gas to disperse the 
Occupy Central participants?  
☐strongly agree     ☐agree   ☐neutral   ☐oppose   ☐strongly oppose      
☐don’t know about the event 
 
9. Do you agree that the Occupy Central impairs the rule of law in Hong Kong?  
☐Strongly agree  ☐agree   ☐neutral   ☐oppose    ☐don’t know   	
10. Do you think that the Occupy Central was influenced by “foreign forces”? 
☐very much   ☐somewhat influenced     ☐neutral   ☐not much          ☐not at 
all   
 
11. What do you think are the reasons for the occurrence of the Occupy Central 
movement? 
☐ Political ideals of Hong Kong locals in their pursuit for democracy and freedom 
☐ Dysfunction of Hong Kong political system and governance 
☐ Dissatisfaction of Hong Kong locals with economic and social development   
☐ Dissatisfaction of Hong Kong locals about the increasingly reduced 
cultural/social/economic gap between Hong Kong and Mainland 
☐ Influence by foreign forces 
☐ Influence by pro-independence force in Hong Kong 
☐ Influence by colonial culture 
☐ Don’t know 
☐ Other 
 
12. How many times have you been to the site of the Occupy Central movement? 
☐ 0             ☐1-2          ☐ > 2         ☐ Refuse to answer 
 
13. Do you know about the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan? 
☐ very much     ☐ somewhat      ☐ not much         ☐ not at all 
 
14. Do you agree with the Sunflower Movement: 
☐ Strongly agree (please to to Q16)     
☐ Agree (please go to Q16)     
☐ Indifferent (please go to Q16)     
☐ Oppose (please to to Q15) 
☐ Strongly oppose (please go to Q15) 
☐ Don’t know (please go to Q16)     
 
15. Reasons for Opposing the Sunflower Movement： 
☐ Violates the Constitution and rule of law     
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☐ Influenced by pro-independence ideologies in Taiwan 
☐ Unwise to oppose trade treaty  
☐ Shouldn’t occupy the Legislation Yuan and the Executive Yuan  
☐ Don’t know 
☐ Other 
 
16. Do you know about the “disappearance” of Hong Kong bookseller Lee Bo and 
others? 
☐ very well    ☐ somewhat    ☐ not much    ☐ not at all 
 
17. Do you agree with the coercive measures that the authorities took towards Lee Bo 
and others? 
☐strongly	agree			☐agree 	 	☐indifferent 	☐oppose					☐strongly oppose    
☐don’t know 
 
18.What is your opinion on the disappearance of Lee Bo and four other booksellers?  
☐ Violates the rule of law principle 
☐ Violates “One Country-Two Systems” principle 
☐ Mainland authorities handled the case according to the law  
☐ Lee Bo and others were punished for their own wrong doings 
☐ Involvement of foreign forces 
☐ Don’t know 
☐ Other 
 
19. Please choose the three major media sources that you used to obtain Hong Kong 
news: 
☐ Official mass media in Mainland China (e.g., CCTV, Global Times and local 
newspapers) (please go to Q21)     
☐ News websites (e.g., Sina.com and Tecent.com) (please go to Q21)     
☐ Social media (e.g., Weibo & Weixin) (please go to Q21)     
☐ Hong Kong media (please to to Q20)     
☐ Climb over the wall to gain access to overseas media  (please go to Q21)     
☐ Information from friends in Hong Kong (please go to Q21)     
☐ Other (please go to Q21)     
 
20. Which Hong Kong Media source do you most frequently access? (please select 1-
3 responses): 
☐ Mingpao 
☐ Takungpao 
☐ Apple Daily  
☐ Wenweipo 
☐  Oriental Daily  
☐☐TVB 
☐☐South China Morning Post 
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☐☐Online Media 
☐☐Free newspapers  
☐☐Other 
 
21. Your gender: 
22. Your age: 
23. Your education: 
24. Your monthly income: 
25. Your place of residence: 
26. Number of times that you have visited Hong Kong/length of period of stay in 
Hong Kong: 
27. Your occupation in Hong Kong/Mainland China: 
 
 
 
 
 
